Derivative Securities and Corporate Governance
FrankH. Easterbrool4
Corporate governance consists in the set of legal and contractual
precautions that investors use to minimize the agency costs of management. Governance devices matter when they are the least-cost
ways to constrain managers. If markets-including the capital market,
the product market, and the managerial-services market-do the job
better, then governance devices will not have much significance.'
Many of the papers soon to be presented concern the workings of
these devices. Authors ask, for example, how well the market for managers works, and under what circumstances tender offers protect investors by going over managers' heads, or when managers are justified
in rejecting bids above market price. I want to open the Symposium
by asking whether developments in capital markets, particularly the
proliferation of new derivative securities, supply a lower-cost alternative to governance mechanisms, and if so, over what domain.
I offer these thoughts in the spirit of Ronald Coase's paper The
Nature of the Firm, published in 1937.' Coase observed that "the firm"
is just the result of a choice between organization by bureaucracy and
organization by market. When markets are relatively expensive, then
people choose to conduct their activities in ways that substitute other
t
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means, such as employees subject to superiors' instructions. As the
price of making arrangements by markets falls, people use them more
and bureaucracy less. How much production is organized inside firms
thus depends on relative costs and fluctuates as these costs (including
costs created by the legal system) change. Many modern developments entail reductions in the costs of market organization, which affects how production will be organized within (or across) firms, how
capital is mustered, how use of each pool of capital is governed, and so
on.

"Derivatives" are instruments or contracts that are based on the
price of something else. Their value depends on a different asset, and
hence is derivative from it. The classic derivatives are puts and calls on
stock and futures contracts. The option known as a "call" entitles the
holder to buy a share of stock at a fixed price. If Acme Industries is
trading for $95 today, I may own a call that gives me the right to buy
Acme for $100 during the next ninety days. What this means in practice is that I own the market price of Acme to the extent that it exceeds $100 before the option's expiration. One share of stock has been
split into two: the seller of the option owns the stock if its price remains under $100, and otherwise the option holder owns the stock.
Likewise the long on a futures contract has an option to buy wheat or
oil if the value exceeds the contract price. The value of these options
depends on the market price of the asset and its volatility. If that volatility is known and the price has been set in a reasonably efficient
market, the value of the option can be derived from the famous BlackScholes option pricing formula, for which Myron Scholes and Robert
Merton have received the Nobel Prize in Economic Science.'
Until Black-Scholes, derivatives were synonymous with options
and futures contracts; the only way to reckon a value was to allow
trading and observe what happened on the floor. With the BlackScholes pricing model, however, a liquid market in the derivatives became unnecessary-all that is essential is a market in the underlying
assets. Thus, it became possible to build one-off derivatives for specific
customers and uses. Instead of being limited to an option that transfers something simple (such as "the price of Acme to the extent it exceeds $100 within ninety days"), it is today possible to tailor-make
complex promises, such as the dividends of Acme bonds between
years fifteen and twenty-three after their issuance, or the value of
volatility in the stock market as a whole, or the difference between
4
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rules of the Nobel Prize preclude posthumous awards.)
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U.S. and Japanese interest rates, or the default risk of a bond separated from its interest rate risk. If you can imagine something, and can
find a market from which to get prices and volatility corresponding to
the thing you have in mind, you can build and sell that thing. You can
have derivatives in Chicago's weather, for example-the volatility is
well known from climate data, and prices can be proxied in the energy
market.
There is a large and burgeoning literature on the financial aspects
of derivatives. Scholars are interested in pricing derivatives, using
them to hedge risks, protecting purchasers of derivatives from their
own ignorance (and others' deceit), and so on. But almost no one
seems to be interested in the relation between derivative instruments
and the corporations whose securities are the physical assets on which
the derivatives depend. Curing that omission is today's task.
When I say that "no one is interested in the relation between derivatives and governance," I exclude legislators and the popular
press-they are interested all right, but not on an intellectual level.
Enron sold the kind of climate derivatives I just mentioned and many
related risk-shifting instruments,. and the University of Chicago is
among the buyers. This enabled the University to lay the risk of heating and cooling costs off onto a firm that had a large portfolio of energy supplies and could bear that risk better than the University, or
hedge the risk more efficiently.
What has made Enron a dirty word these days is not what it did
for clients, but the absurd values it attached to these contracts and its
other activities. The contracts themselves continue to be valuableand, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal,other derivatives
protected many investors against the fall. Intermediaries sold approximately $10 billion in Enron credit-risk derivatives-that is, instruments that paid off not when interest rates changed, but only
when the issuer of the bond failed to pay.! Stockholders could have
protected themselves similarly if Congress had not for years prohib5 Well, almost no one. One author has explored the question from a different perspective.
See Philipp V. Randow, Derivate und Corporate Governance, 254 Zeitschrift ftir Unternehmenss

und Gesellschaftsrecht 594 (1996). (I am indebted to Theodor Baums for this reference.) There is
also a literature posing the question how governance structures affect firms' decisions to use derivatives. Roberta Romano's essay on derivatives in the revised New PalgraveDictionaryof Economics and the Law discusses some of this literature. See Roberta Romano, Derivative Securities
Regulation, in Peter Newman, ed, 1 The New PalgraveDictionaryof Economics and the Law 590

(Stockton 1998).
6 This is not to say that Enron was a middleman between counterparties. Instead it took a
good deal of the risk of any given transaction but tried to keep its portfolio in balance. This is the
sort of strategy pursued by firms such as Bankers Trust in the swaps market. Details of Enron's
energy-market operations are unimportant to my exposition, and I disregard them.
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ited the sale of single-firm futures contracts. For twenty years they
were illegal. 8 The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 20009 has
changed that-but it still has not been implemented by regulations
(even though the futures markets are rarin' to go), and trading will be
limited to wealthy and sophisticated investors. Congress apparently
still does not believe that employees who are hog-tied by ESOP or
401(k) plans that radically under-diversify their financial capital
should be able to hedge their risks.
But my problem is not one of political economy. It would be nice
if small investors had access to the same portfolio insurance as large
ones do, but my concern today is elsewhere. It is one of institutional
design, not whether investors can hedge or whether managers at Enron can use derivatives to pull the wool over accountants' eyes. People
can commit fraud using partnerships as vehicles, too, and no one says,
"Well, Enron used partnerships as a tool of fraud, so let's abolish the
partnership." Derivatives also attract the gullible such as the treasurer
of Orange County, who thought that he could get four times the market return without bearing abnormal risk. Wrong. High return goes
with high risk. Long-Term Capital Management produced four times
the market return for five years, and when it suffered reverses everyone seemed surprised. Why? High return is compensation for high
risk.
Reverses hardly show that the risk was not worthwhile. The Wall
Street Journalrecently observed that Ford lost $1 billion on its inventory of palladium. The headline screams "How Ford's Big Batch of
Rare Metal Led to $1 Billion Write-Off."' Seems that Ford went long
in palladium to ensure an ample supply for use in making catalytic
converters. It was speculating that prices would rise and was stockpiling to protect itself. When engineers figured out how to clean the exhaust with much less palladium, the price of that metal plummeted
and Ford lost a bundle. The Journal observed that Ford should have
done what General Motors did: buy palladium futures (not the metal
itself) and hedge by selling offsetting positions. Of course, if Ford had
hedged, then, when physical palladium fell $1 billion, the derivatives
would have produced an offsetting profit. But I can just see the contrary headline if (as Ford was betting) the price of palladium had continued to rise. Then the Journal might have screamed: "How Ford's
Big Batch of Derivatives Led to $1 Billion Write-Off'-for if the
physicals had risen, the derivatives would have fallen. A hedger actu8
Much of the history may be found in Chicago Board of Trade v SEC, 187 F3d 713 (7th
Cir 1999), and ChicagoMercantile Exchange v SEC, 883 F2d 537 (7th Cir 1989).
9 Pub L No 106-554,114 Stat 2763, codified in scattered parts of the United States Code.
10 Gregory L. white, PreciousCommodity: How Ford's Big Batch of Rare Metal Led to $1
Billion Write-Off,Wall St J 1 (Feb 6,2002).
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ally wants to lose on derivatives; reverses in futures markets go handin-glove with wins in the underlying portfolio.
But hedging is just a sidelight. What enables a firm to hedge also
enables it to unbundle-to get out of a business altogether, leaving
tasks to the market and eliminating the need for "governance" of that
aspect of production. Ford wants to make cars and take the business
risk of chassis designs, motor designs, and predicting the demand for
large versus small cars. It does not want to speculate in precious metals. Until recently, to run an auto business you had to run a metals
business as well; yet the management and decision structures suitable
to automobile manufacture may be unsuited to metals management.
Derivatives would have enabled Ford to run an auto business divorced from a metals inventory-even though you need the metals to
make cars. And in principle, derivatives enable a firm to disgregate
fully. Just as Boeing and Airbus buy parts of planes from subcontractors-what the airframe manufacturers largely do is design and assemble things that other firms construct-so derivatives in principle
allow every firm to disgregate every aspect of production. Each can
take the risks it prefers, while unloading others. This strongly affects
what governance mechanisms are best.
What goes with this is an ability for investors to disgregate a
business even if managers are stubborn. Suppose that you fancy a
Ford with just the auto business, not the metals inventory. You can
home-brew that security: you buy Ford stock and sell a palladium contract in a futures market. This does more than allow the investor to
synthesize a firm that does not exist. It puts a price tag on the Ford
metals business: both investors and managers can see whether the
metals business contributes to Ford's value. If it turns out that the synthetic security of Ford-minus-metals is worth more than a real share of
Ford stock, then Ford's managers get a signal that they should spin off
the metals business; and if they don't do this, potential takeover bidders know that there is a potential profit in acquiring Ford, splitting
off those endeavors that should be managed separately, and selling the
revamped firm back to the market."
To generalize: Additional ways to price or trade financial instruments ought to strengthen the capital market as a disciplinary force.
What makes the capital market more efficient not only makes governance less important-in what field does it retain a comparative advantage?-but also makes governance better. That's the central point of a
11 There are other ways to profit, including persuading the managers to change course in
order to make money in their own derivative instruments. All that matters for my purposes is
that means exist to change a firm's behavior and to profit from that change. As long as this can
occur, one can write derivative instruments that pay off when the contingency occurs, and the
price of these derivatives then value the anticipated effects of that contingency.
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seminal essay Michael Jensen and William Meckling wrote more than
twenty-five years ago.'2 Entrepreneurs must persuade investors to part
With their money. In order to do so, the entrepreneurs must put in
place governance structures that investors value at more than their
costs; if they fail, they raise less money than they could have done, and
thus themselves pay for the costs of their mistakes. Bad governance
structures in place at money-raising time hurt the entrepreneurs, not
the investors. Entrepreneurs and managers are rarely accused of leaving money on the table and thus have powerful reasons to choose
wisely.
This mechanism for putting optimal governance devices in place
depends on accurate pricing of securities issued by firms with different
governance structures. Pricing will be inaccurate to the extent that the
price-discovery function of securities markets has shortcomings (as it
must-information and the price-discovery process is costly, and
unless there is some inaccuracy in securities prices, no one will find it
worthwhile to gather that information). It also could be inaccurate if
risk aversion dissuades investors from changing their portfolios
enough so that prices impound all available information. Portfolio
theory tells investors to diversify, but if too many people take that advice, the price-discovery function of markets is impeded, and the terms
of corporate charters will not be accurately priced. If investors do not
fully diversify (in other words, if some investors hold large blocs in order to monitor more carefully, a substitute for optimal governance
structures), they are bearing extra risk for which they demand compensation that the outside investors do not receive; supplying that
compensation may require adverse adjustment of internal controls. As
a result, firms will select governance devices inferior to those available
at the time. But derivatives will enable differently structured firmsand differently governed firms-to be priced, so that the information
can still be captured and used.
II
Derivatives, which provide wonderful hedging instruments, overcome many of the obstacles to accurate pricing and hence to the design of optimal terms. Do blocs create undiversified risk? Hedge it
away! Are investors reluctant to move a lot of money quickly to take
advantage of arbitrage opportunities? They can hedge these risks too.
Do investors accept some inferior governance and management terms
because they create a risk-return combination that is otherwise unattainable? With widely available and inexpensive derivatives, markets
12
See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,3 J Fin Econ 305 (1976).
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offer every conceivable risk-return combination (any that is unavailable and desired easily can be manufactured), so investors will unanimously favor the maximization of expected value within each firm.'3
That trading in commodities futures contracts (one kind of derivative) serves a powerful price-discovery function is well established.
People who have information about the supply and demand for wheat
can put that information to use more rapidly in futures markets than
inspot markets for the physical commodity, so futures markets are the
best source of information about asset value. Most economists assume
that this carries over to the case in which the underlying asset is a security. It is cheaper (by as much as an order of magnitude) to trade in
futures and options markets than in the stock market, and trading in
futures is often faster as well. Margin requirements are lower. (Margin
in securities markets is an extension of credit; in futures markets it is a
guarantee of performance, and the clearing corporations are so effective as guarantors of performance that little margin is necessary.) Informed traders therefore prefer derivative markets -especially because it is easier to conceal the traders' identities in these markets, and
greater liquidity makes it possible to buy or sell additional quantities
before price changes in response to the volume of trading. Derivatives
markets can act as if the underlying security had a much larger float
than it does.
An ability to buy and sell synthetic instruments instead of the
real thing also helps markets to avoid legal controls. Must a firm have
its "real seat" in Germany and use codetermination for its securities to
trade in Frankfurt? Must a firm conform to U.S. accounting and disclosure standards in order to trade in New York? Currently most financing is obtained from home markets because of these and other
complications; the expedient of issuing ADRs and similar instruments
that trade in other countries does not get around these costs very effectively. But the transactions costs of derivatives are one-tenth the
cost (or less) per share the cost of trading stock, and an even larger
gain compared with ADRs. Listing (and many other controls) drop
out with derivatives, especially swaps and other OTC products that
are built to order. Just trade synthetic instruments of the U.S. firm in
Germany, and of the German firm in the U.S.; all of the information
held by investors in both countries thus is brought to bear on price,
and markets then do their work in perfecting (or superseding) corporate governance devices throughout the world.4 Firms that list their
13 See Harry DeAngelo, Competition and Unanimity, 71 Am Econ Rev 18, 19 (1981). See
also Louis Makowski, Competition and Unanimity Revisited,73 Am Econ Rev 329,329-30 (1983);
Louis Makowski and Lynne Pepall, Easy Proofs of Unanimity and Optimality without Spanning:
A PedagogicalNote, 40 J Fin 1245,1245 (1985).
14 Robert Merton hints at this point in his Nobel lecture, though he does not make the tie
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securities in multiple nations' markets experience both lower costs of
capital and lower volatility.5 Costs of complying with multiple national
systems of disclosure are a serious impediment to this practice, but the
ability to trade synthetic derivative instruments can overcome it.
Similarly, a corporation might remain private (that is, without
publicly traded equity) but obtain the benefits of outside monitoring
via derivative trading. Myron Scholes suggested in his Nobel lecture
that derivatives markets would permit the creation of "synthetic entities'"6-business ventures that operate single projects, and therefore
are not governed in the traditional sense. "Governance" is necessary
only for long-term multi-party ventures; the rules of "corporate governance" are what the equity investors receive in lieu of the firm payout promises that uncertainty precludes the firm from issuing. Investors in small projects are protected by contract; so are debt investors
in larger firms. Governance is a second-best solution for residual
claimants in ongoing organizations. If uncertainty can be controlled
via derivatives markets, the organization of production can be simplified and handled by direct contract (as many joint ventures now are)
rather than by "governance" of any kind.
If for Coasean reasons business operations continue to be organized into general-purpose corporations rather than special-purpose
teams, still the role of markets will increase and that of governance
shrink. Think back to the Ford example. Ford organized metals acquisition into the same firm that built exhaust-gas-control systems. Why?
Futures contracts enabled the firm to acquire palladium without taking price risks. That is to say, it allowed Ford to shrink what is in the
domain of governance and expand what is in the domain of markets.
Ford's investors have paid a $1 billion penalty because the managers
got the governance-versus-market choice wrong. Managers will be on
the lookout for opportunities to get it right tomorrow. And because it
is possible to have derivatives on almost anything, the zone of "governance" should be shrinking for a long time to come.
Derivatives also can be used to check the functioning of those
governance systems that persist. By trading futures and options on securities yet to be issued, investors could improve the pricing of securities issued as part of initial public offerings, and therefore make it

back from securities prices to governance devices. See Robert C. Merton, Applications of OptionPricingTheory: Twenty-Five Years Later,88 Am Econ Rev 323,326 (1998).
15 See Ren6 M. Stulz, Globalization of Equity Markets and the Cost of Capital at 4-6,
NYSE Working Paper No 99-02 (1999) (on file with author); G. Andrew Karolyi, What Happens
to Stocks that List Shares Abroad?: A Survey of the Evidence and Its ManagerialImplications,
NYSE Working Paper No 96-04 (1996) (on file with author).
16 Myron S. Scholes, Derivatives in a Dynamic Environment, 88 Am Econ Rev 350, 367

(1998).
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clearer to entrepreneurs which governance devices are most highly
valued. Although they have not developed yet, markets that price alternative governance terms are easy to contemplate (and create). A
corporation contemplating an IPO of its stock could tell the markets
this and permit a period of trading in hypothetical securities. If the futures contract for shares of this firm with and without a staggered
board, with and without poison pills, and so on, the entrepreneurs will
acquire vital information about which devices investors value and can
either choose those that yield the best price or see explicitly how
much must be forgone to select different devices. If they choose a
setup that investors value less highly, the entrepreneurs will pay an
explicit price. And as long as a governance structure is properly
priced, investors are fully protected even if that structure falls short of
perfection.
Once single-stock futures start trading in the near future, we will
have a fascinating test. If markets in futures on securities with different governance structures fail to come into being, their absence would
imply that governance terms are now priced efficiently, or at least are
not so far off that money is to be made from arbitrage (else there
would be a market for these contracts). Perhaps it would show, as Professors Kahan and Rock argue, that a plethora of equilibrating devices
has offset the effect of traditional governance tools and poison pills. If
these markets are created, then we can learn the real value of different governance devices. Even for existing firms, it should be possible
to create synthetic stocks: say, the value a Pennsylvania corporation
would have if incorporated in Delaware instead. The prices of these
derivatives will tell managers which divisions to spin off and which
governance devices to adopt or jettison. From my perspective, all
should have an equal chance provided that they are priced. If investors will pay for poison pills, then more power to them, and courts
should stop ordering directors to redeem. But if pills sell for a negative price when derivatives break out governance devices separately,
then managers and courts would have a duty to get rid of them. Lei
investors decide.
Derivatives also would offer tender offer bidders a way to recover their costs of search and profit if an auction breaks out and
someone else gets the prize; that possibility would make me more
sympathetic to Lucian Bebchuk's auction model-even as his Article
for this Symposium suggests that he is becoming more sympathetic to
the Easterbrook and Fischel passivity model! Again, though, my main
preference is to develop a way to attach prices to these possibilities
and then let investors decide for themselves. Derivatives will help in
this process of pricing governance terms.
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Derivatives may influence the conduct of managers more directly
and make formal governance devices less important. Managers tend
to be risk-averse, for they are undiversified in both financial and human capital. (Firms try to align managers' interests with those of investors by compensating them with stock or stock-linked devices,
which implies low diversification; managers' human capital also is specialized to the firm, or at least to its industry.) Risk-averse managers
tend to select projects with low variance, although investors-who can
act as if risk-neutral because of ready diversification in financial markets-prefer projects with the highest expected value, even if this
means higher risk. At least in principle, derivatives allow managers to
hedge the risks they bear, which would lead them to be more amenable to higher-variance projects with higher returns. Firms may not
want managers to hedge in this way; if they do so perfectly, their own
fortunes will be uncoupled from the firm's, and their incentive to
maximize firm value will fall even if they become risk neutral. But it
should be possible to design a package of compensation that strikes an
optimal balance along the interest-alignment and risk axes. 17 Firms already use packages of compensation including derivatives, although
they have had to create the derivatives themselves. 8 As synthetic instruments become more pervasive, it should be possible to do much
better in the explicit markets.
Some firms could want their managers to use derivatives to increase the payoffs of their positions in order to produce rewards for
taking the risks that investors prefer. For many reasons, some of them
undoubtedly related to legal regulation (or the threat of regulation), a
firm's top managers receive only a small fraction of their contributions
to investors' wealth-less than 1 percent.' 9 The large market swings
observed in takeover contests, or when management changes unexpectedly, imply that managerial decisions affect firms' value to a substantially greater degree than that. Interest-alignment is accordingly
weak (a condition that makes "governance" more important). Henry
Manne has argued that inside trading can counteract this effect, ' but
in the United States (and increasingly elsewhere) this has been for17 See generally Robert Dean Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and
Agency Costs,35 Houston L Rev 399 (1998).
18
Scholes reminds us that the high-yield notes issued to managers in leveraged buyouts
and similar transactions combine debt with an option, and the option may be the predominant
element of value. See Scholes, 88 Am Econ Rev at 364 (cited in note 16).This can be an effective
substitute for "governance" devices in motivating and constraining managers. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, High-Yield Debt as an Incentive Device, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ 183,186 (1991).
19 Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J Polit Econ 225, 261 (1990) (concluding that managers receive 0.3 percent of marginal

contributions).
20

See generally Henry Manne, InsiderTrading and the Stock Market (Free Press 1966).
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bidden on the ground that it "unfairly" allocates to managers gains
that "really" belong to investors. The fairness objection is twaddle, for
reasons Daniel Fischel and I have laid out,2' but the rule of law to
which it led cannot be brushed off. Unless, perhaps, by using derivatives. Managers may purchase claims on the upper tail of the distribution of outcomes, multiplying their compensation if the firm does
well-and without any possible claim that they have filched these
profits from the firm's equity investors. The parties on the other side
of the transactions don't own stock; the derivatives are just side bets.
Investors as well as managers can trade single-stock futures. In
particular, unless regulators gum up the works, they should be able to
go short in futures markets by posting cash margin, but without the
need to borrow shares. The obligation to post shares themselves as
collateral in a short sale cripples this equilibrating device in stock
markets. People whose information implies a lower price tomorrow
thus have trouble making a profit-and thus are less likely to bring
that information to bear-in stock markets. When short selling is difficult, stock prices are less informative than they could be. Many of the
proposals in this Symposium (and in the halls of legislatures and regulatory agencies) take the form: "Stock prices can be inaccurate, so financial markets therefore do not always induce managers to act in investors' best interests; therefore we should impose on managers the
following governance rules ..... With markets in derivatives produc-

ing the information that short sales in stock markets have been unable
to produce, arguments of this stripe should fade into history. It is impossible to see how legislators, regulators, or judges could claim a
comparative advantage over financial markets once trading in derivatives ensures that all public information is embedded in securities
prices.
III
What I have said so far implies that we can stop worrying about
corporate governance. Things will take care of themselves nicelythough that doesn't imply the end of conferences about corporate
governance! Yet the more I have thought about the interaction of derivatives and corporate governance, the more I doubt that we can be
so confident. The coming experiment is going to be interesting, and
the conclusions are not forgone. Let me offer a sketch of reasons for
this concern.
Most are just the opposite sides of the coins I have presented.
Consider the use of derivatives to permit managers to hedge their un21

See Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure of CorporateLaw at 253-76 (cited in

note 1). There may be other problems, however, to which I allude below.
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derdiversified financial and human-capital portfolios. All to the good,
if investors prefer that course for managers. Suppose, however, that
managers choose it on their own and effectively liberate their
compensation from the firm's performance. Investors won't be
happy; both financial and governance devices can be defeated by this
maneuver. Although managers could promise by contract not to use
derivatives in this way, policing compliance could be very difficult.
Derivatives markets facilitate anonymous trading, and, because most
kinds of derivatives are not "securities" for regulatory purposes, the
reporting requirements that apply to securities transactions do not
come into play. If violations of a contractual promise not to trade are
rarely observable, the penalty can exceed the manager's wealth,
making enforcement impractical.2 In other words, derivatives reduce
the cost of cheating on promises to be undiversified (in order to align
interests between managers and investors). When the cost of deceit
goes down, the quantity rises.
Similarly, derivatives make it less costly for firms to hedge their
risks-less costly, that is, for managers to indulge their risk aversion.
Most derivatives are owned by firms, not by individual investors. The
custom-designed swaps market, which at least by notional amount accounts for two-thirds of all derivatives outstanding,24 is limited to
banks, substantial corporations, and very large institutional investors.
But why are corporations and large investment funds hedging? Investors are diversified and effectively risk-neutral (something that the derivatives market ensures) and do not gain from hedging at the firm
level-not unless the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem has been
repealed in recent years. Ford could have hedged away its palladium
risk, but taking that risk in the first place was silly. Its investors are
risk-neutral, so why was Ford trying to lock in a price by buying metals in the first place? Why did its managers think that they knew more
than the market about the future price of palladium?
In theory one can explain hedging at the firm level as a device to
reduce bankruptcy costs (and the associated costs of financial failure),
and thus the firm could take additional real risks without increasing
the likelihood of incurring these deadweight reorganization costs. But
bankruptcy is not particularly expensive compared with other means
22 See Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive Compensation,7 DePaul Bus L Rev 301,323-29 (1995).
23 This is one of the genuine problems with inside trading. How is a firm that wants its
managers not to trade supposed to enforce that decision? See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider
Trading as an Agency Problem, in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds, Principalsand
Agents: The Structure of Business 81, 93-94 (Harvard Business School 1985). The enforcement
problem is considerably more difficult when the trading occurs in derivatives than when it occurs
in the stock market.
24
See Scholes, 88 Am Econ Rev at 362-63 (cited in note 16).
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of unwinding affairs and paying investors, which makes the alternative
explanation-that trying to smooth risk at the firm level is just a visible agency cost of management-more attractive. If this is right, then
the explosion of derivatives markets demonstrates the failure of corporate governance devices (and compensation packages) to curtail
managers' risk-aversion. It is hard to formulate empirical tests that
will separate these hypotheses for hedging by corporations. Data remain scarce.'
Next revisit the observation that informed traders prefer derivafives markets, because they can get faster and cheaper execution with
a greater probability of anonymity. Anonymity is an obvious worry,
because price effects depend more on who is trading (and the information that can be inferred from this fact) than on how much is being
traded (though quantity also may permit inferences about what is
happening at the firm). If informed traders increase their profits because concealment delays price adjustments, then the supposed pricediscovery benefits of derivatives markets are overstated. Conceivably,
the "benefits" could be negative.
Movement of informed or frequent traders from securities markets to derivatives markets has another potential effect on pricing, an
effect that could be substantial. When major traders decrease their
participation in the market for stocks and bonds, these markets become less liquid. A reduction in liquidity means a higher bid-asked
spread, which means an increase in the expense investors incur for
each trade. The price for which a security sells in the market is the
present value of the anticipated cash flows, less the present value of
transactions costs of holding and trading the instrument. Exchangelisted stock changes hands on average every two years, and the anticipated expenses of these trades, when discounted to present value, can
be a significant fraction of the stock's price, especially when the firm is
small (not large enough to use S-3 registration).2' A reduction in securities prices attributable to a higher bid-asked spread in a less liquid
market not only interferes with the accurate pricing of securities (and
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their firms. Romano's essay in the New Palgraveexpresses a cautious hope that this result is an
outlier. See Romano, DerivativeSecuritiesRegulation at 596 (cited in note 5).
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thfus optimal choice of governance structures ex ante) but also means
that some projects with positive net present value cannot be funded in
capital markets.
Which effect of derivatives trading dominates: better price discovery, or reduced liquidity in the stock market? This is similar to the
question whether investors gain from having stock traded on multiple
markets. Concentration of trading in a single market (as used to be the
case under a rule of the New York Stock Exchange) maximizes liquidity and brings all traders to one forum for price-discovery purposes; if
one market has an effective property right in trading, the market also
will adopt devices to facilitate these effects, while if trading is scattered the ability of other markets and traders to take a free ride on information generated by the dominant market will reduce both liquidity and pricing accuracy. But concentration of trading in a single place
also conduces to monopoly, a persistent problem in the securities
business. Theoretical arguments therefore can be made either way
about the effects of increasing the number of places where securities
and their derivatives are traded. The issuer itself has the right incentives to choose between trading in one place and trading in many, because its investors will capture the gains or feel the losses. But under
current law in the United States, the issuer has no say in the matter-a
new market can trade the firm's stock, or options on its stock, or other
derivatives based on its stock, without the issuer's consent. A study by
Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson shows that when a firm's securities (or options on its securities) begin to trade on an additional market, the bid-asked spread rises about half of the time and falls the
other half. The difference depends on the firm's size: the larger its
float, the more likely the additional trading is to yield a reduction in
bid-asked spread (and a gain in share price).n
This means that we cannot give thumbs up or thumbs down to the
effect of derivatives on a market-wide level; the effect likely varies by
firm. That's the usual conclusion to any discussion about governance
devices, too. One-size-fits-all is as bad in the corporate market as in
the clothing market. For example, voting stock is normally best because it vests control with the holders of the residual claims,n but
sometimes family control through nonvoting shares may be superior
(or at least the family may be willing to pay for this control by accepting a lower price for the shares it sells without votes). The great diversity of state and national laws, coupled with the fact that these laws
permit entrepreneurs to design many of the details of corporate gov2
28
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ernance, permit choice of institutional design. What makes the Jensen
and Meckling mechanism for the selection of optimal governance devices work, however, is the fact that the costs of these choices are
borne by those who make them. Because most derivatives are designed and traded without the consent of, and without regard for, the
corporation involved, this condition is not met. Perhaps we can discuss
at the conference the question whether it is possible (and, if so, desirable) to give the firm property rights in derivatives based on its securities. Maybe Marty Lipton, inventor of the poison pill, can invent a new
kind of stock that solves this problem too! We shall see. For now,
though, I am content to see the Symposium get under way in a building nicely heated by virtue of a derivative product the University of
Chicago purchased from Enron.

SYMPoSIuM:
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
OF THE MODERN BusINEss CORPORATION

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND TAKEOVERS

Managerial Power and Rent
LucianArye Bebchuk,
Extraction in the Design
Jesse M. Fried&
of Executive Compensation .............................. David . Walker 751
Explaining Executive Compensation:
Managerial Power versus the
Perceived Cost of Stock Options .................... Kevin J. Murphy 847
Discussion moderated by David A. Weisbach
How I Learned to Stop Worrying
and Love the Pill: Adaptive
Marcel Kahan &
Responses to Takeover Law ............................ EdwardB. Rock 871
Designing Mechanisms to Govern
Takeover Defenses: Private
Contracting, Legal Intervention, and
Unforeseen Contingencies ................................... JenniferArlen 917
The Best of All Possible Worlds
(or Pretty Darn Close) ................................. Reinier Kraakman 933
Discussion moderated by Richard A. Epstein

